


Community based wildlife management in Africa: a comparison of approaches, Central African Republic, Tanzania and Benin

A perspective from practice



Professor Yves Hausser
University of Applied Sciences of
Western Switzerland
Natural Resource Management
Department

Presentation plan

i. Introduction: CBWM in Sub-Saharan Africa in context

1. Case studies: a comparative analysis

- Village hunting zones (ZCV) the poorly known experience from CAR
- Tanzania: WMA: good theory, wrong practice, an issue of governance
- Benin : the co-management choice

2. Key factors

- Rights and legal framework: which type of devolution?
- Economics of biodiversity: global context, benefit sharing, winners and losers, the meat factor
- Political dimension: an issue of power, governance, transparency and accountability
- Technical aspects with benefits – the role of cooperation - a question of global governance

3. Conclusion: what and how to learn from experiences ?

Introduction

Brief history of CBWM in Africa

Global context: failure of fences & fines approaches, neo-liberalization and democratization, converging agenda on environment and poverty reduction

Precursors 1987-1988: CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and ADMADE in Zambia, both supported by USAID and NGOs

Early followers 1988 - 1990:

Central African Republic – ZCV following pilot experiences supported by EU and NGO's

East Africa - Tanzania WMA approach developed after pilot experiences developed with support from GTZ and DFID, USAID and NGO's

Late followers 1992: West Africa – Benin – AVIGREF following pilot experiences developed with support from GTZ and EU

Introduction

Brief history of CBWM in Africa

Without any judgment, most of the communications about these experiences - scientific or addressed to general public - are the product of supporters or critics

Results of these experiences are rarely evaluated / monitored in medium to long terms

Results of these experiences are rarely compared systematically

Science seems of poor support

Raise the question of sustainability

Raise the question of the conditions for replication

Raise the question of the cooperation agencies and Western based conservation organizations role and position in these processes

Objective

Providing an insight from practice through a comparative analysis of 3 different experiences of CBWM from East, Central and West Africa

Briefly define and present each experiences and processes

Analyse the outcomes and results of the described processes

Compare the different experiences through the following aspects: rights, economics, politics, technical, governance

Provide some recommendations for further developments in CBWM policies and practices

1. Case studies

Comparative analysis: country profiles

Country	Land area (squ. km)	Population (million)	Pop. growth rate (%)	GNI per capita USD /year	Life expect. at birth	LDP ranking
Central African Republic (CAR)	623'000	4.95	2.15	463.2	50.07 years	159
Tanzania	945'000	42.74	2.00	485.4	52.85 years	148
Benin	112'622	9.33	2.91	754.9	59.84 years	134

Sources: www.data.un.org ; www.exxum.com

1. Case studies

Comparative analysis: country conservation profiles

	Central African Rep.	Tanzania	Benin
Total land area (squ. km)	623'000	945'000	112'622
Protected areas (NP, GR)	68'918 / 11.1 %	52'000 / 5.5%	12'372 / 11 %
Hunting areas	198'235 / 31.8 %, 69 areas, 11 CBWMA	250'000 / 26.5 %, 149 areas, 20 CBWMA	4'092 / 3.6 %
Active hunting areas (squ. km)	66'000 / 10.6 %	200'000 / 21.2 %	4'092 / 3.6 %
Number of outfitters	10	48	5
Estimated contribution to GDP	1 %	10 %	NA
Land and Resource ownership	Land and wildlife remain property of the state. Temporary devolution of management and user rights	WMA's are established on village land. Wildlife resource remain property of the state. Temporary, discretionary and limited devolution of management and user rights	Land and resource remain property of the state, but real co-management with significant devolution of user and management rights
Number and size of areas under CBWM or co-management	11 areas, approx. 43'000 squ. Km, process initiated in 1992	20 areas, approx. 23'000 squ. Km, process initiated in 1991	5 areas, 4'092 squ. Km, process initiated in 1992
Number of villages / estimated population	47 – pop. 16'000	176 – pop. 200'000	25 (Pendjari) + 75 (W), h e p i a

1. Case studies

Village hunting zones (ZCV), the poorly known experience from Central African Republic

Initiated in 1992 and developed since with the continuous support of a EU project in northern CAR (1988 – ongoing through ECOFAC CAR)

Model based on the demarcation of village hunting areas where villagers benefit from devolution of management and user rights

The pilot project was turned into legislation following promising results and difficulties encountered by ZCV to operate in legal limbos

Village hunting zones are managed by regularly elected management committees. Committees receive support & technical assistance from the project and the Ministry

Management responsibilities are important planning and management of the areas (building of camps, tracks, anti-poaching, ecological monitoring, monitoring of hunting activities)



1. Case studies

Village hunting zones (ZCV), the poorly known experience from Central African Republic

User rights: each hunting zone is allocated by the management committee of the CBO to a trophy hunting company for a 5 years lease. Each village hunting zone benefit from a hunting quota allocated by the Ministry on a yearly basis. Villagers have a preferential right of access to the meat.

Quotas are then sell to trophy hunting companies that lease the area to the CBO's.

A significant portion of the hunting fees (between 25 and 100 %) are kept locally and reinvested in management and support to socio-economic development benefitting communities



Particularity of the CAR system, 50 % of some hunting fees are due to be paid in advance of the season so as to permit investment by management committees in charge

1. Case studies

Village hunting zones (ZCV), the poorly known experience from Central African Republic


Results are impressive in a context of State failure as is the case in CAR. There are 11 operating Village hunting zones in 2010, covering an area of 43'000 squ. km., with 47 villages and a population of 16'000

8 ZCV generated an income worth 130'000'000 FCFA in 2004 – 2005 (Roulet et al., 2008)

Results are significant regarding benefits to communities, particularly in fields like health, education and social services

Benefits include employment for community members (seasonally / permanently)

Results are equally significant in terms of conservation as village hunting zones have higher densities of major wildlife species than national parks (Renaud et al., 2005, Bouché et al. 2010)



1. Case studies

**Tanzania: Wildlife Management Areas (WMA's) –
good theory, wrong practice, an issue of governance**

WMA's have been initiated and framed in 1992 – 1993 in the framework of two conservation projects, the Selous Conservation Project (GTZ) and the MBOMIPA project (DFID) in the Ruaha ecosystem

Model based on the demarcation of WMA's on village land where villagers benefit from devolution of management and user rights

WMA's were subsequently legalized through the adoption by the Wildlife Division of Regulations attached to the Wildlife Act

WMA's are managed by regularly elected committees

Management responsibilities are important: planning and management of the areas (building of tracks, anti-poaching, ecological monitoring, monitoring of hunting activities)




1. Case studies

Tanzania: Wildlife Management Areas (WMA's) – good theory, wrong practice, an issue of governance

User rights: an annual hunting quota is provided yearly to each WMA by the Wildlife Division. For some WMA's there are two quotas, one for trophy hunting, the other for village hunting and meat production. Villagers have a preferential right of access to the meat

Quotas are then sell to trophy hunting companies that allocate the area to the CBO but under approval of the Wildlife Division director

Legislation remains unclear on benefit sharing scheme...



1. Case studies

**Tanzania: Wildlife Management Areas (WMA's) –
good theory, wrong practice, an issue of governance**

Up to date more than 20 WMAs are at various stage of development, with 16 pilot areas demarcated by the Government and several subsequent areas declared lately. They cover over 23'000 squ. km.

All these WMAs have been developed with external support (GTZ SCP & KRCD, DFID MBOMIPA, GTZ-IS & UNDP-GEF SNWCP, AFRICARE ULCCP, The Danish Hunter Associations, WWF, AWF, WCST, ADAP).

Administrative process to establish WMAs have been qualified as excessively complex and hindering their development

Costs of establishing a WMA has been estimated by AFRICARE at a minimum USD 150'000



1. Case studies

**Tanzania: Wildlife Management Areas (WMA's) –
good theory, wrong practice, an issue of governance**

Economic evaluation is difficult, only few WMAs recently received the final stage approval and are fully operational.

First income received by some WMAs in 2010 – 2011 are encouraging, with around 25'000 USD yearly per WMA (3'000 USD / village)

Interesting comparison with joint venture between villages and private operators for photographic safaris revealed that from village point of view the latter may be more attractive

Wildlife Division retain a considerable control over all the process (allocation of the hunting block, quota attribution)

Hunting sector appears reluctant to enter into agreement with villagers



1. Case studies

Benin : the co-management choice

For various reasons the Benin made a different choice: the establishment of a co-management scheme of all protected areas

Communities neighboring conservation areas are co-managing the areas with the government agency, the CENAGREF, through a network of village based associations, the AVIGREF

Co-management experience has been initiated in Benin since 1992 in Pendjari conservation area - the Pendjari National park and surrounding hunting zones - with the support of the GTZ

The pilot project inspired legislation following promising results and difficulties faced by AVIGREF to operate in legal limbos

The system was further extended to the W regional park area with support from the EU funded ECOPAS programme in the late 90's



1. Case studies

Benin : the co-management choice

Co-management scheme include participation of AVIGREF to the management of both the park and hunting zones


AVIGREF do benefit of 30 % of all income of parks and reserves. In the current situation 60 to 80 % of these income are generated by the trophy hunting

Benefit sharing scheme also include a clear and preferential access to bushmeat for AVIGREF members

Diversification of income strategy was supported by the Pro-CGRN

Small village hunting reserves (REVICA) under the management of AVIGREF were developed on village land

AVIGREF of the Pendjari benefited from important support in terms of capacity building coming from the Pro-CGRN project



1. Case studies

Benin : the co-management choice

Results: AVIGREF are established and operational in 24 villages bordering Pendjari biosphere reserve and 75 villages bordering W regional park and biosphere reserve

Most of the revenue (45'000'000 FCFA in 2007-2008) are generated from the 30 % of hunting fees, but relative part of other activities such as community based tourism, conservation agriculture are increasing

At least in the Pendjari ecosystem where wildlife populations are monitored, populations of most large mammal species are increasing

AVIGREF became key stakeholders that held other stakeholders accountable and constrained to respect legislation

The AVIGREF Pendjari are very combative local stakeholders. Empowerment is impressive and the system appears more sustainable and autonomous than the Villages Hunting Zones of CAR and WMAs of Tanzania



1. Case studies

Synthesis

All studied CBWM processes were initiated with strong input and support from cooperation projects (bi – multi lateral and NGO's)

None of the process would have been achieved without these inputs and pressures towards legislation reforms from donors

Governance of the hunting sector, which is the main economic pillar of these approaches, remains problematic



2. Key factors

Rights and legal framework: which type of devolution?

Resource property rights

None of the process goes beyond the temporary, discretionary and contractual transfer of management, access and user rights of the resources to representative of local communities

In all studied cases, the wildlife resource remain state property, even in the Tanzanian case when it is located in village lands

Land property rights

In two of the studied cases, CAR and Benin, land remain property of the state (with the exception of REVICA), but communities do have regulatory role and control access and use

In Tanzania, WMA are established on village lands. The land legislation and wildlife legislation are in conflict at that level.

2. Key factors

Rights and legal framework: which type of devolution?

Institutional aspects

All studied cases supported the creation of a new institution as representative of local communities. It took the forms of management committees and associations in French speaking Africa and CBO's - associations in English speaking Africa

Another crucial stakeholders are the decentralized local governments that benefited from the decentralization and that have been choose to manage these process. In CAR and Benin, the communal level has been defined as appropriate, while in Tanzania it is the District council level

All of them are subject to the same criticism: they are not appropriate in the sense they are not close enough to individual beneficiaries of these policies and open the way to bad governance and corruption

2. Key factors

Rights and legal framework: which type of devolution?

Institutional aspects

**All studied cases face governance and corruption challenges.
Decentralization process face numerous resistance from public servants during implementation.**

Decentralization frequently mean loosing power, prestige, economic income, and influence for the public servants

In CAR the power of the donor supporting the experience (who is the biggest donor of the country) creates an in-balanced situation with the government that benefited the local level.

In Tanzania and Benin, donors are less able to exert pressure on government. In Tanzania the bad governance of the wildlife sector brought initial supporters to withdraw their support from natural resource sector (GTZ, DFID). In Benin and Tanzania there are clear resistance from within the Wildlife departments to the implementation of these policies

2. Key factors

Economics of biodiversity: global context, benefit sharing, winners and losers, the meat factor

From all studied cases, only two generates significant income at local level, the CAR and the Benin cases, the Tanzania having not yet achieved its potential

In CAR despite having the most advantageous benefit sharing scheme among studied countries the government retain control through the hunting quota attribution

From a relative point of view, governments and the private sector continue to keep the lion share of the incomes generated

In all studied cases, governments maintain key control over the process, particularly through the allocation of hunting quota and the control of the area allocation process

In Tanzania the un-precise definition of a benefit sharing scheme let the door open to discretionary abuse by the government who is supposed to define benefit sharing precisely on a yearly basis

2. Key factors

Economics of biodiversity: global context, benefit sharing, winners and losers, the meat factor

Use of revenue generated: most of the time the income are invested in management costs (which frequently generate employment) and in activities supporting local development (education, health, agriculture, local development)

Benefit accrued from CBWM are thus generally realized at collective level: building of school or health centers, payment of salaries in health or education sectors

A benefit that appear essential is the preferential access to game meat for local communities. When strictly regulated like it is the case in Pendjari, Benin it has a significant potential to create an understanding of the link between conservation and development among local communities.

Generally CBWM approaches demonstrate a poor capacity to support the development of NTFP livelihoods

2. Key factors

Political dimension: an issue of power, governance, transparency and accountability

Governance at every level appears as a determining factor in the success of these processes

At local level, governance of local institutions is key in establishing the needed confidence between members necessitated by collective actions

Transparency and accountability are essential in the establishment of sustainable models of governance

At that level mis-behaviours seem more frequently the product of government or private sector agents than communities

2. Key factors

Technical aspects with benefits – the role of cooperation – a question of global governance

**Among the most important weaknesses of the approaches that need to be
addressed : a strong dependency to external support of local
institutions created to manage these areas**

**Supporting processes rather than projects...
Imply a change in donors policies and practices**

Imply a change in intervention agencies and NGO's policies and practices

**Imply a change in the manner cooperation and conservations
organizations see their own roles**

Partners rather than leaders

**Providers of support in capacity building benefiting local communities
organizational structures**

**Imply adapting intervention tools to local context... logical framework
analysis, expert technical wording, financial phasing of projects
funding, reporting and evaluation methodologies seems all more
adequate to our needs and requisite than to the one of beneficiaries...**

3. Conclusion: learning from experience

Most of CBWM experiences are running short of expectations

In the studied cases, results thought encouraging are still only preliminary and need to be confirmed over time

The studied cases demonstrate that even without a transfer of property rights CBWM may benefit local communities at different levels

Empowerment appears as a key result of these processes and has been observed even in un-achieved situations like in Tanzania

The studied cases clearly demonstrated the limits of CBWM approaches, that seem conditioned by several factors, among them the presence of significant populations of wildlife species that are attractive for international markets in hunting / not biodiversity!

Second limit: the relative proportion of fees kept at local level should be raised to significant level (e.g. minimum 50 %) but in parallel good governance practices such as independent financial audits should be established

3. Conclusion: learning from experience

Recommendations

Major threat to the CBWM development is its poor ability to compete with other forms of land use when considering short time benefit

Another major threat is linked with the poor capacity of CBWM experiences to document benefit from a biodiversity point of view, a stronger effort need to be put on documenting evolution of ecosystem and species under CBWM

Major threats to the CBWM development are linked with the development of the mining and oil & gas sector, which should formally and clearly be forbidden in CBWMA

When strictly PA are failing to defend their integrity in face of economic interests, it is doubtful that community conserved area would perform better